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Abstract: This paper reviews Ghana’s recent experience with downstream petroleum products pricing and 
deregulation and looks at its implications for the nation’s energy security needs. The Government of 
Ghana in June 2015 put in place a deregulation policy that had the expectation of allowing marketers and 
importers of petroleum products to sell directly to consumers by setting their own prices. The policy has 
the primary objective bring an end to government subsidies on the product which arises in from exchange 
rate losses and consumer subsidies. The study welcomes government’s decision to revert to the 
competitive market forces using automatic price formulation as this removes implicit subsidization and its 
distortionary effects on the economy. With the advent of full deregulation, the burden of managing forex 
risks will shift from the government to the BDCs and TOR, and any such losses will become their 
prerogative. Petroleum subsidies, if any, should be redesigned and better targeted at the poor in the form 
of direct cash transfers as well as entrepreneurial skills training to improve their social and living 
conditions. Subsidies create distortionary effects and further exacerbate fiscal pressures as government 
has to borrow or tap into its reserves to offset price differentials. 
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1 Ghana Growth and Development Platform (GGDP) Working Paper. See: http://ghanagdp.org/  
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1 Introduction 
The passage of the National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 [Act 691] saw the establishment of the 
National Petroleum Authority (NPA) as the petroleum downstream industry regulator whose mandate is 
to regulate, oversee and  monitor activities in the petroleum downstream industry; to establish a Unified 
Petroleum Price Fund (UPPF); and to provide for related purposes.2 This came against the backdrop of a 
period of state controlled imports, distribution and pricing of petroleum products. As Ghana moves 
towards consolidating her middle-income status, energy security concerns and challenges will persist. 
Despite producing over 100,000 barrels of crude oil per day, the country depends on imports of crude oil 
(net importer) to meet its petroleum products requirement, which have grown at an exponential phase 
because of growth in the economy. Consequentially, the country is therefore subject to the vagaries of a 
volatile international market for crude and petroleum products. 
Government’s deregulation policy with the support of the IMF and World Bank post the completion of 
the debt relief package under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, had the following 
objectives: (1) removal of restrictions on the establishment and operation of facilities; (2) removal of 
restrictions on the importation of crude oil and petroleum products and (3) removal of price controls. 
Despite the Authority and industry as a whole chalking some milestones3, the critical component of the 
2005 regulatory reforms, which deals with full-scale deregulation through the application of a transparent 
automatic petroleum pricing formula for cost recovery, remains to be achieved to date. 
 
 
2 Section 2 of the of National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 Act 491. See: 
http://npa.gov.gh/npa_new/downloads/npaAct_doc.pdf  
3 Example such as putting in place the framework to licence Bulk Distribution Companies (BDCs) who foreword sell 
wholesale to the Oil Marketing Companies (OMCs) 
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The Government of Ghana states that its strategic policy focus for the petroleum downstream sub-sector 
is to “attract investments in order to expand the capacity of the existing infrastructure in the medium to 
long –term”4, of which the pillar is to deregulate and liberalise the operations in the sector to allow 
private sector participation in building and operating refineries as well as ancillary infrastructure such as 
depots. This will be achieved using a combination of administrative and regulatory changes anchored on a 
pricing framework that aims at full-cost recovery based on the following: 
 
i. “Ex-refinery prices of petroleum products will continue to be based on import parity prices of 
petroleum products  
ii. Transportation and distribution charges for petroleum products will be regulated to ensure 
reasonable profit margins for transporters and distributors  
iii. Cross-subsidies between petroleum products will be applied, as necessary, to achieve specific 
national development objectives  
iv. Uniform national prices for petroleum products would be maintained.”5  
2 Petroleum Products Pricing Regime 
Petroleum products imported into the country by the BDCs are regulated by the NPA with an objective of 
ensuring full cost recovery, government revenue generation and uniformity of prices through the through 
the Unified Petroleum Price Fund (UPPF). Full cost recovery within the value chain is based on the import 
parity pricing (IPP) benchmark. The IPP benchmark6 is the 'landed cost' of refined fuel to Ghana, which 
includes the international price for refined fuel brought in from Rotterdam for example (Freight on Board 
(FOB) Price), freight charges, exchange rate, customs and port duties, insurance and losses. It represents 
that the price that the BDCs (importers) would pay in case of actual import of product at the respective 
Ghanaian ports. The rationale behind the IPP benchmark is to have a strong relationship with the actual 
costs of fuel imports into Ghana taking into account global developments. 
NPA employs a two-week inventory window (1st-16th of the month) whereby the two-week average of 
the FOB prices of the products is computed using a pricing reference such as Platts.7 The historical 
average exchange rate of cedi to the dollar within the two-week timeframe is then forwarded into the 
equation.8 Ancillary charges such as port duties are then added to arrive at the Ex-refinery price 
4 Ghana’s Energy Policy, June 2009. Available: http://www.energymin.gov.gh/wp-content/upLoads/EC-Energypolicy-
final-June-2009-FINAL.doc  
5 ibid 
6 See: http://www.slideshare.net/theoacheampong/breakdown-of-petroleum-pricing-in-ghana  
7 See http://www.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/MethodologyReferences/MethodologySpecs/Europe-africa-refined-
products-methodology.pdf  
8 Provision has been made in recent times to allow forward trades in the exchange rate by the BDCs so as hedge 
their forex exposure.  
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calculated in Ghana pesewas per litre. Approved taxes and levies passed by Parliament are then added 
along with various OMC (distribution) margins to arrive at the final Ex-pump price, which is the price the 
public buys fuel at the various filling stations. Fuel taxes and margins typically make up about 35-40% of 
ex-pump fuel prices — see charts below for price build up.9  
 
 
9 All Prices in Ghana Pesewas per Litre except LPG in GHp/kg. Data: NPA Ghana 
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Figure 1 Breakdown of the Petroleum Pricing Regime in Ghana 
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High Level Breakdown: 
 
1. Ex-Refinery price which is based on import parity = CIF of product + other related charges.  
2. Ex-Depot price = Ex-Refinery price + Levies/taxes  
3. Ex-Pump price (Maximum Indicative Price, MIP) = Ex-Depot price + marketing margins.  
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Figure 2 Petroleum Prices and Exchange Rates in Ghana 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Pr
ice
s (
GP
/L
t),
 E
xc
ha
ng
e 
Ra
te
s (
US
D/
Gp
) 
Eu
ro
pe
 B
re
nt
 C
ru
de
 O
il 
Sp
ot
 P
ric
e 
FO
B,
 $
/b
bl
 
Petrol Ex-Refinery, Gp/Lt Europe Brent Crude Oil Spot Price FOB, $/bbl
Exchange Rate, USD per Gp Petro Ex-pump, Gp/Lt
Retail Price Data:  NPA Ghana 
Exchange Rate Data: Oanda.com 
Page | 6  
 
3 How Do Subsidies Arise? 
The exclusive right of government through the NPA to intervene in the price build up implies that 
often the full cost of the product is not passed to consumers through the final ex-pump prices. The total 
taxes, levies, and surcharges are not included in the aforementioned setup. Consider this example: say a 
BDC lands petroleum products at the Tema port at an ex-refinery price of US$1.3 million; however, 
government decides to cap the ex-pump price (ex-taxes and levies) at US$1 million, then an under-
recovery or subsidy component of US$300,000 would have to be provided to the BDCs to reflect the cost 
of the landed product. This form of consumer subsidies arise when the prices paid by consumers, 
including both firms (intermediate consumption) and households (final consumption) are below a set 
benchmark price.10 These typically come in the form of pre-tax consumer subsidies that arise when prices 
consumers pay is below supply cost – supply cost is the international price adjusted for distribution and 
transportation costs.11  
Up until the recent announcement by the NPA to pursue the full-scale deregulation agenda12, the 
regulator had been arguing for the removal of subsidies but was forced to kowtow to political pressure. 
To date, the public remains in the dark on the pricing formula vis-à-vis the amounts accrued due to cross-
subsidization, TOR Recovery Levy, indirect and direct taxes, refinery margins and profits of the OMCs as 
well as the subsidy margins. As per our understanding, the cause of the brouhaha is the automatic 
adjustment formula, which has not been implemented to the latter. What prevails now is some sort of 
capping mechanism where the price adjustments on the global markets, which only constitute 65% of the 
price build up, do not automatically reflect in local prices taking into account the exchange rate 
movements and inflation to maintain parity.  
The government does not import the refined products or crude oil but the BDCs are fully paid to 
cover the 65% component, which includes the additional monies spent in procuring the products to 
account for FX losses and inflationary pressures. So, the question that needs asking is: has government 
been partially subsidizing this 65% or reducing the other 35% tax component of the fuel price thereby 
calling it a subsidy? In essence, is this a post-tax subsidy? Generally, energy subsidies have wide-ranging 
economic consequences. As the IMF13 notes,  
“While aimed at protecting consumers, subsidies aggravate fiscal imbalances, crowd-out priority 
public spending, and depress private investment, including in the energy sector. Subsidies also 
distort resource allocation by encouraging excessive energy consumption, artificially promoting 
capital-intensive industries, reducing incentives for investment in renewable energy, and 
accelerating the depletion of natural resources. Most subsidy benefits are captured by higher-
10 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/subsidies/  
11 ibid 
12 See http://pulse.com.gh/news/npa-strikes-again-petrol-price-deregulation-begins-today-id3869678.html  
13 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf  
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income households, reinforcing inequality. Even future generations are affected through the 
damaging effects of increased energy consumption on global warming.” 
The economic costs of subsidies can have dire consequences on the economy with resultant 
substantial loss of revenues and above average consumption patterns for petroleum products. In 
addition, it prevents investments in the supply and distribution infrastructures - including refineries – and 
does lead to smuggling and adulteration of products. There is no gainsay that in Ghana, most of the 
petroleum subsidies have often gone to benefit middle class consumption due to the poor nature of the 
policy design and implementation.  
4 Tema Oil Refinery and Ghana’s Energy Security 
Currently the majority (about 80%) of the finished products consumed in the country are imported 
by the BDCs from North West Europe using mainly Rotterdam spot prices with an element of hedging. 
Transportation charges, extra demurrage charges, insurance, etc., are added to the price build up before 
the cargo even berths at the Tema Harbour. Years of neglect created inadequate local refining and 
storage capacity. Poor management, under-recovery of costs and inadequate working capital culminated 
in the refinery becoming one of the heavily indebted parastatals in Ghana. This notwithstanding, the 
Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) has the potential to play a major strategic role in securing Ghana’s long-term 
energy security needs. The refinery has to be reorganised and its working structures revamped – it is in 
dire need of critical infrastructure upgrades.  
Our proposal is for a corporate structure that sees an international strategic investor (partner) 
coming on board with a combination of debt and/or equity financing. We propose a 20-40-30 ownership 
mix whereby the Government of Ghana through GNPC or some special purpose investment vehicle 
acquires  20% of TOR’s shares; 40% floated on the Ghana Stock Exchange for ordinary Ghanaians and 
institutional investors (including the SSNIT, BDCs and OMCs) and the remaining 30% offered to the 
international strategic partner operating on a public-private partnership basis. The composition of the 
Board and management will reflect this new structure and will be incentivised to act in the best interests 
of the organisation with little government interference. The economics of petroleum products demand 
and supply in the sub-region justifies the need for TOR to consider expanding beyond the current 45,000 
barrels per day to over 100,000 barrels per day capacity. Taking into account an 85% operating efficiency, 
the refinery operating at the current distillation capacity of 45,000 bbls/d should be able to process 
38,250 bbls/d or 13.96 million barrels per annum of products. However, as Bukari (2013) notes: 
“…TOR’s actual performance however has been far below this level with the highest point of 
production being 2004 where 11,228,000 barrels per annum were produced. This translates 
into an average daily production of 30,762 barrels. At this level of production, TOR’s 
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utilisation rate was at 77%. The implication is that for all other periods TOR’s level of 
capacity utilisation has been below this level, hitting the lowest level of 19% in 2009.”14 
The refinery is configured to process light to medium grade crude feedstocks with an additional 
Residual Fluid Catalytic Cracker (RFCC) unit that expands its versatility and profitability by allowing heavier 
molecular fractions to be converted into short chain primary high-end products such as petrol and 
naptha. The RFCC remains the ‘cash cow’ of any refinery. By virtue of TOR’s configuration to process light 
crude feedstocks, the quality of the heavy fractions (bottoms) that determine the RFCC yields and product 
properties are high and thus of much economic value. Therefore, we should get more products per every 
barrel of crude oil, including the heavy fraction processed. The refinery economics (and margins), which is 
the difference between the wholesale value of the oil products  TOR produces and the value of the crude 
oil from which they were refined taking into account efficiency factors, is such that the country stands to 
gain significantly from having a fully functional refinery. This comes in terms of jobs creation, availability 
of fuel and taxes paid to the treasury.  
All oil refineries produce value-added petroleum products from crude oil feedstocks and profitability 
is a function of many different variables including:  
i. Feedstock costs (primarily crude oil) 
ii. Fuel costs and other operational costs  
iii. Regulatory Costs – e.g. complying with emissions regulations (particularly CO2, NOx and SOx) 
iv. Market prices for the products produced – i.e. government set or market driven 
The economics are such that it is actually more prudent to import the raw crude blends from regional 
markets such as Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon for TOR to locally process. This can be negotiated 
through a bilateral agreement or paid at competitive international rates using standard Letters of Credit 
and other financial agreements, processed locally and then add profit margins to the finished products 
taking into account efficiency and import parity factors for both local and regional exports to landlocked 
countries like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Businesses are primarily set up to achieve the primary 
objective of meeting demand or the availability of a market for the product or service being offered — 
profit maximisation objective. The petroleum demand trajectory in Ghana and the West African sub-
region continues to enjoy steady growth with gasoline and diesel being the two most important products 
in demand. Oil consumption in West Africa was projected to rise to 665,000 bbls/d in 2013, driven by a 
considerable growth in demand for diesel, aviation fuel, LPG and gasoline.15 It is estimated that Nigeria 
14 See http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/files.php?file=cepmlp_car16_43_373109631.pdf  
15 See http://africanarguments.org/2013/05/10/africa%E2%80%99s-oil-and-gas-outlook-2013-part-1-%E2%80%93-
by-rolake-akinkugbe-at-ecobank/  
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alone imports nearly $7 billion worth of refined products annually, due to low capacity utilization of its 
refineries, which stood at less than 30% in 2012. 
 
Figure 3 Impact of Market Size on Price Levels
 
Source: Kojima et al, 201016 
 
Figure 4 Trend of TOR’s Capacity Utilisation
 
Source: Bukari, 2012 
16  See Petroleum Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa - World Bank Report. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/336099-1158588096604/eifd15_ssa_oil_markets.pdf  
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Figure 5 Oil Product Demand Growth By Sub-Region, 2000-201217 
 
5 Proposals for Reform and Concluding Thoughts 
Prior until the recent announcements by the NPA to implement full deregulation, what persisted in 
the downstream sector was a pseudo-deregulated environment. Here, the regulator attempts to verify 
the import costs of the BDCs and by extension fixes the prices of end-user petroleum products taking into 
account subsequent taxes and levies. The policies of the NPA over the past years - and for that matter 
government - have contributed to distorting the market, which in turn has created a perverse set of 
incentives – adverse selection. This in turn has led to unnecessarily high prices at the pumps even when 
benchmark crude prices have fallen on the international market as well as the creation cartel-like 
oligopolies that have little incentive to invest in additional refinery and/or storage capacity. The 
petroleum pricing and subsidy regime in Ghana is poorly targeted. It has often gone to subsidize middle 
class consumption, the largest consumers of petroleum products through their ownership of vehicles, 
generating sets and other machinery. Petroleum subsidies should be redesigned and better targeted at 
the poor in the form of direct cash transfers as well as entrepreneurial skills training to improve their 
social and living conditions. Subsidies create distortionary effects and further exacerbate fiscal pressures 
as government has to borrow or tap into its reserves to offset price differentials. The cross-subsidy margin 
on kerosene and premix, so called social fuels, can be maintained. But these need to come directly from 
marginal levies other products like petrol and diesel that have relatively fixed inelastic demand patterns.  
This notwithstanding and given the commencement of full scale deregulation, salaries and by 
extension minimum wage increments need to be commensurate with general price levels to account for 
17 See IEA Africa Energy Outlook, 2014. 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo2014_africaenergyoutlook.pdf  
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the multiplier effect of this household on expenditures such as transportation and food. According the 
Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS6), the annual average household expenditure is GH¢9,317 with a 
mean annual per capita expenditure of GH¢3,117. On average, a person spends about GH¢8.85 per day of 
which food expenditure accounts 47% of total household expenditure whereas expenditure on housing 
(includes water, electricity and gas) accounts for 11.3% of total expenditure and 6.9% for transport.  It will 
be important for government to take a second look at some taxes on ex-pump prices which are no more 
justified. For instance, the exploration levy is to be given to GNPC for their exploration activities. 
However, since the commercial production of oil, GNPC has been duly funded from Ghana’s share of oil 
revenues. Another example is the TOR debt recovery levy. The removal or reduction of some of these 
levies/taxes will minimise the impact of oil price volatility on consumers. In addition, consumers should 
have access to information especially on pricing, to inform the buying decisions. NPA should build its 
capacity to publish daily or weekly or bi-weekly adjustments of petroleum prices. This will help promote 
competition. 
Again, NPA should simplify the registration process of BDCs to allow investments into the sector. 
With the current number of 28 BDCs, there are fears for possible collusion among them. Since TOR is not 
operational, at least for now, any form of collusion can threaten Ghana’s energy security and may lead to 
consumer exploitation. We also call on the government to expedite action on the ownership structure of 
TOR to make it operational. We foresee TOR as a market stabiliser especially in the medium to long run. 
In conclusion, domestic petroleum product prices can be set by government or allow competitive 
market forces often using a pre-defined formula or an ad-hoc basis. It is welcome that government has 
decided to revert to the competitive market forces using automatic price formulation as this removes 
implicit subsidization and its distortionary effects on the economy. With the advent of full deregulation, 
the burden of managing forex risks will shift from the government to the BDCs and TOR, and any such 
losses will become their prerogative. In addition, giving the introduction of retail competition, the various 
OMCs will have the opportunity of negotiating different ex-refinery prices with the respective BDCs, 
which should ultimately enhance consumer welfare if done right. So long as prices for crude oil fluctuate 
on the world market, prices paid locally will vary from time to time. Given government’s commitment to 
full-cost-pass-through pricing regime, it becomes imperative that policymakers know the demography of 
the people consuming the products — even within the middle class— and their elasticities of demand so 
appropriate interventionist policies can be implemented. A more detailed study of the consumption 
patterns of petroleum products between the rich, and between public and private sector institutions 
might yield some interesting results.  
Page | 12  
 
6 References 
Bukari, D. (2013). Why Do Refineries Perform So Poorly? The Case Of Ghana's Tema Oil Refinery (TOR). [online] 
Available at: http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/?news=32390  [Accessed 14 Aug. 2015]. 
IMF, (2015). IMF and Reforming Energy Subsidies. [online] Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fad/subsidies/ [Accessed 14 Aug. 2015]. 
Tornyi, E. (2015). NPA strikes again: Petrol price deregulation begins today. [online] Pulse.com.gh. Available at: 
http://pulse.com.gh/news/npa-strikes-again-petrol-price-deregulation-begins-today-id3869678.html  
[Accessed 14 Aug. 2015]. 
IMF (2013). Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications. [online] Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf  [Accessed 14 Aug. 2015]. 
Ministry of Energy Ghana, (2009). Ghana’s Energy Policy, June 2009. Available: 
http://www.energymin.gov.gh/wp-content/upLoads/EC-Energypolicy-final-June-2009-FINAL.doc  
IEA (2014). Africa Energy Outlook 2014. [online] Available at: 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/weo2014_africaenergyoutlook.pdf  
[Accessed 14 Aug. 2015]. 
Akinkugbe, R. (2013). Africa’s oil and gas outlook 2013 (Part 1). [online] Available at: 
http://africanarguments.org/2013/05/10/africa%E2%80%99s-oil-and-gas-outlook-2013-part-1-
%E2%80%93-by-rolake-akinkugbe-at-ecobank/ [Accessed 14 Aug. 2015]. 
Kojima, M., Matthews, W. & Sexsmith, F. (2010). Petroleum product markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Analysis 
and Assessment of 12 Countries. [online] Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/336099-
1158588096604/eifd15_ssa_oil_markets.pdf [Accessed 14 Aug. 2015]. 
 
Page | 13  
 
